I have always wondered why Hitler was not interested in the A bomb. I mean the Germans did think that the A bomb was some years away and they had more pressing needs, but it's not like Hitler to just miss an opportunity like that. Maybe he just didn't grasp how powerful the technology was. I guess it was kinda hard to believe that a five ton bomb could flatten a city...until you actually see one do it.
Could Germany have won WW2?
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I have always wondered why Hitler was not interested in the A bomb. I mean the Germans did think that the A bomb was some years away and they had more pressing needs, but it's not like Hitler to just miss an opportunity like that. Maybe he just didn't grasp how powerful the technology was. I guess it was kinda hard to believe that a five ton bomb could flatten a city...until you actually see one do it.
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Countries only have so much industrial capacity and you have to decide where your prioraties lie; Germany produced the finest land force, the UK had always invested in the Navy. The UK had the most advanced A-bomb programme - but didn't have the capacity to produce it - so we gave it all to the US, who had the capacity to produce it all.
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No, early warheads were about 4x times greater than a V2's payload - they were very heavy bombs for an aircraft - even the largest american bomber had to be specially modified to carry them (more to do with shape than weight).
A lancaster could have carried one - they were no way near suitable for placing on a missile.
Interestingly the benefit of H Bombs are that thet are not only more powerful but much lighter and use less material - making multiple warhead ICBMS all around better systems than A-bombs; unless you're on the receiving end.
Soldato
The USA wasn't interested in the nuclear bomb either at first and it had to be pushed on them. A lot of the groundwork development in atomic theory all came from the UK - they just lacked the resources needed to build one themselves because of the war.
This is all wrong - the size of the USSR as an empire helped it, it had been like poor China.
Germany today is the most advanced and developed country in the world despite all the effort against it.
It should have been number 1 power military if they didn't get too greedy with the territories and resources willingness.
Hitler wanted the V2 program to be able to deliver much more than ~900kgs of explosives - though it would have been well beyond the end of WW2 before that could have been realised - they were testing submarine launched capabilities as well as pushing towards a rudimentary ICBM.
Soldato
Nuclear weapons is only a solution in a "leave us the **** alone" type of fight. It's not useful to a country that wants to re-create empire - attack, take the land, move in, germanise the invaded people, live happily ever after in uberheimat from ocean to ocean. It's like torching the car you want to steal.
Could they win though? Up until WW2 Germany never fully understood the problem every empire before them already encountered - you can only control 'that many' people before you run out of your own people to maintain the control. It was very old school Prussian way of thinking - "surely, if you beat them, they'll honourably surrender, understand they need to be Germans now, learn German, become Germans and rise their children as Germans." It could never work long term.
Could they win though? Up until WW2 Germany never fully understood the problem every empire before them already encountered - you can only control 'that many' people before you run out of your own people to maintain the control. It was very old school Prussian way of thinking - "surely, if you beat them, they'll honourably surrender, understand they need to be Germans now, learn German, become Germans and rise their children as Germans." It could never work long term.
Yes Germany could have won 'WW2' but would it have been called WW2 if they had?
There are lots of factors why they did not though:
Failing to defeat, or at least neutralise Britain before turning on Russia. I question how serious Hitler was about invading Britain in 1940; Hitler had already made peace overtures, and if Halifax had been PM instead of Churchill we could have accepted. The whole summer of 1940 is interesting; was air superiority really needed to carry out an invasion, given Britain's lack of bombers? The bigger threat was surely the Royal Navy. In my view Hitler was merely trying to soften Britain up to force us to sue for peace, rather than and real threat of invasion. Regardless, the failure to neutralise Britain was to have serious consequences; Britain was able to be enough of a nuisance and a distraction to divert significant forces away from the Eastern Front to other theatres of war such as North Africa, and also to defend the Reich from the bombing campaign. Of course once the US entered the war, Britain also became an aircraft carrier and army camp parked just off the continent from where Allied forces could bomb and ultimately land back into Western Europe.
Germany chose poor Allies. Italy was really a sentimental ally; Mussolini had been the pioneer fascist dictator and paved the way for Hitler, but was very weak militarily. The Italian campaign in the Balkans and Greece in early 1941 went so badly that Germany had to send forces to bail them out, fatally delaying Operation Barbarossa by crucial weeks. Japan was also a very limited ally, lacking in any raw materials and being solely focused on expansion in Asia; there was precious little collaboration and pooling together of assets and forces amongst the Axis powers, unlike the Allies.
The failure to capture Moscow was a mistake. To capture the Soviet capital, and potentially remove Stalin from power could have been a game-changer. The Soviet Union would have continued to exist perhaps, but only behind the safety of the Ural mountains. Instead Hitler ordered the swing south, partly for sound reasons to capture the oil fields of the caucuses, but also to capture and destroy Stalingrad for purely ideological reasons. Germany was always going to attack Russia; to suggest otherwise is to show little understanding of Hitler and his ideology. He had written about the desire for Lebensraum (Living Space in the East) in Mein Kampf, and had a deep hatred of both Communism and (of course) Jews, both of which he linked together. Evidence of Soviet aid to Germany during the period of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, prior to Barbarossa, is more based on Stalin pretty much doing anything to stave off the threat of invasion for as long as possible. There are stories of German reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory in the Ukraine in early 1941 being routinely ignored, and the Soviets even avoided performing military maneuvers or build-up close to the border with Germany, so as to not antagonise them at all. Stalin was merely trying to avoid invasion, or at least delay it for as long as possible, in much the same way that Britain and France sacrificed Czechoslovakia at Munich in 1938 to appease Hitler, thereby staving off the threat of war, when analysis of the diaries of Hitler and his close advisors much later reveals that he was actually likely to back down if Britain and France had stood firm at that point.
Hitler increasingly became militarily autocratic, ignoring the advice of his Generals and advisors. Partly this was out of over-confidence after a few stunning victories, but also deep mistrust after the attempted assassination by Stauffenberg et al in 1944. He was certainly no master-strategist, and his refusal to allow his armies to retreat even one inch, even when it would have made sense militarily to enable them to regroup and resupply was a purely dogmatic, ideological folly.
Declaring war on the USA after Pearl Harbor was a mistake, but not as significant as is often made out. Yes, he forced America's hand by doing so - there is the argument that the isolationists in America would have only allowed FDR to go to war with Japan, leaving Germany for Britain and the USSR to deal with, but the Axis agreement effectively mean that Hitler had to do so after Japan attacked. The USA was also very involved in the war in the Atlantic by the summer of 1941, providing escorts to convoys from American shores to mid-Atlantic, and there had been skirmishes and incidents between American vessels and German U-boats, such as the sinking of the Reuben James, which was starting to increase the likelihood of America entering the war prior to Pearl Harbor.
There are lots of factors why they did not though:
Failing to defeat, or at least neutralise Britain before turning on Russia. I question how serious Hitler was about invading Britain in 1940; Hitler had already made peace overtures, and if Halifax had been PM instead of Churchill we could have accepted. The whole summer of 1940 is interesting; was air superiority really needed to carry out an invasion, given Britain's lack of bombers? The bigger threat was surely the Royal Navy. In my view Hitler was merely trying to soften Britain up to force us to sue for peace, rather than and real threat of invasion. Regardless, the failure to neutralise Britain was to have serious consequences; Britain was able to be enough of a nuisance and a distraction to divert significant forces away from the Eastern Front to other theatres of war such as North Africa, and also to defend the Reich from the bombing campaign. Of course once the US entered the war, Britain also became an aircraft carrier and army camp parked just off the continent from where Allied forces could bomb and ultimately land back into Western Europe.
Germany chose poor Allies. Italy was really a sentimental ally; Mussolini had been the pioneer fascist dictator and paved the way for Hitler, but was very weak militarily. The Italian campaign in the Balkans and Greece in early 1941 went so badly that Germany had to send forces to bail them out, fatally delaying Operation Barbarossa by crucial weeks. Japan was also a very limited ally, lacking in any raw materials and being solely focused on expansion in Asia; there was precious little collaboration and pooling together of assets and forces amongst the Axis powers, unlike the Allies.
The failure to capture Moscow was a mistake. To capture the Soviet capital, and potentially remove Stalin from power could have been a game-changer. The Soviet Union would have continued to exist perhaps, but only behind the safety of the Ural mountains. Instead Hitler ordered the swing south, partly for sound reasons to capture the oil fields of the caucuses, but also to capture and destroy Stalingrad for purely ideological reasons. Germany was always going to attack Russia; to suggest otherwise is to show little understanding of Hitler and his ideology. He had written about the desire for Lebensraum (Living Space in the East) in Mein Kampf, and had a deep hatred of both Communism and (of course) Jews, both of which he linked together. Evidence of Soviet aid to Germany during the period of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, prior to Barbarossa, is more based on Stalin pretty much doing anything to stave off the threat of invasion for as long as possible. There are stories of German reconnaissance flights over Soviet territory in the Ukraine in early 1941 being routinely ignored, and the Soviets even avoided performing military maneuvers or build-up close to the border with Germany, so as to not antagonise them at all. Stalin was merely trying to avoid invasion, or at least delay it for as long as possible, in much the same way that Britain and France sacrificed Czechoslovakia at Munich in 1938 to appease Hitler, thereby staving off the threat of war, when analysis of the diaries of Hitler and his close advisors much later reveals that he was actually likely to back down if Britain and France had stood firm at that point.
Hitler increasingly became militarily autocratic, ignoring the advice of his Generals and advisors. Partly this was out of over-confidence after a few stunning victories, but also deep mistrust after the attempted assassination by Stauffenberg et al in 1944. He was certainly no master-strategist, and his refusal to allow his armies to retreat even one inch, even when it would have made sense militarily to enable them to regroup and resupply was a purely dogmatic, ideological folly.
Declaring war on the USA after Pearl Harbor was a mistake, but not as significant as is often made out. Yes, he forced America's hand by doing so - there is the argument that the isolationists in America would have only allowed FDR to go to war with Japan, leaving Germany for Britain and the USSR to deal with, but the Axis agreement effectively mean that Hitler had to do so after Japan attacked. The USA was also very involved in the war in the Atlantic by the summer of 1941, providing escorts to convoys from American shores to mid-Atlantic, and there had been skirmishes and incidents between American vessels and German U-boats, such as the sinking of the Reuben James, which was starting to increase the likelihood of America entering the war prior to Pearl Harbor.
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Ultimately Germany wasn't really geared up for an invasion involving the level of amphibious assault, etc. required - they had practically no navy to soften up landing sites via ship to shore bombardment and for the later logistic efforts required, lacking in things like suitable landing craft. Their only chance would have been to control the skies so as to be able to use aircraft to clear the way and for a lot of logistic work once a beachhead had been made and with such a narrow corridor both the RN and RAF could have seriously impacted any invasion force before they got to the British coast if they existed in any real capacity still.
Where did you get that from? The citizens of USSR were poor, but the country itself was extremely rich - by the late 30s it was world's second industrial power after US, with extensive agriculture and full of oil and other natural resources.
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I imagine that German thinking and wargaming of this situation and come up with the solution that in the face of all of Europe being conqured that the British must either:
Make peace
Make a favourable peace
Become an ally
There doesn't seem to much thought given to scenario that Britain might fight on. Victory in the west is supposed to reopen world trade and access to the resources that Germany needs to defeat the USSR, but now they have to fight the USSR without those resources. Britain and the USSR's fate is somewhat entwined - whilever Britain remains in the fight Germany will be under resourced and while the USSR remains their army will be ground down. Had either Britain or the USSR surrendered the remaining party may well have had fo follow.
Operation Sealion appears to be nothing more than a threat and the air battles part of that threat - a very visible display to Britain that Germany is coming for you, so you had better surrender now - under different leadership we may have given into the threat.
Sealion would have been an enormous opportunity for Britain to defeat and destroy Germany's best armies while they were at sea - Churchill might have been looking forward to it.
Soldato
Churchill would have issued “Scorched Earth” orders as the armed forces and Government retreated northwards with Auxiliary Units waging a guerrilla campaign from behind German lines.
Don’t forget that controlling the skies of Southern England wouldn’t mean controlling the Channel as the Home Fleet would have chopped the flimsy German troop barges and their tow vessels into matchwood.
Don’t forget that controlling the skies of Southern England wouldn’t mean controlling the Channel as the Home Fleet would have chopped the flimsy German troop barges and their tow vessels into matchwood.
Man of Honour
The potential issue in a hypothetical scenario would be Nazi Germany developing missiles capable of carrying a much higher payload than a V2. The V2 itself would have been far more dangerous if it hadn't been deployed when Nazi Germany was already close to defeat. There was no defence against a V2 once it had been launched. The only defence was to prevent the launch or to prevent the construction, both of which the Allies did very effectively. But in a hypothetical scenario in which Germany wasn't so battered by late 1944 and/or in which their missile development proceeded earlier, the V2 would have made a big difference and would have been further developed. Longer range, higher payload, better accuracy...all those things were possible. We know that for certain, since it happened after WW2 and played a big part in the space programs of the USA and the USSR.
It's a plausible "alternate history" scenario. Wernher von Braun was working on rockets from the early 1930s and he was brilliant. With enough resources, it's likely that he could have increased the rate of development. With the advantage that missiles provided, it's at least possible that Germany could have been more successful earlier if backed by those missiles. What if, for example, Britain was hit by thousands of V1 missiles in 1939 or 1940? Would it have surrendered? Maybe. What if the USSR was hit by thousands of V1 or V2 missiles in 1941? Would Germany have been able to take, hold and exploit the oil extraction facilities in the Caucasus? Maybe. What if von Braun and his team had ample resources and weren't having their research, development, manufacturing and supply infrastructure bombed all the time? Would they have been able to develop a missile with longer range, higher payload and maybe better guidance? Almost certainly, given that they did exactly that after the war.
Man of Honour
It was, but I suggest two factors that I think are relevant:
1) Germany in 1940 had no hope at all of taking on even a fraction of the British Royal Navy. The British Home Fleet alone wildly outnumbered the entire German navy and in the event of an attempted invasion Britain could have moved a lot more naval ships in from other Royal Navy fleets. There was no way Germany could have built or crewed anywhere near enough ships anywhere near quickly enough to have a hope of winning a naval conflict.
2) Mass troop transport boats in 1940 were highly vulnerable to attacks by planes, without needing bombers. If the Luftwaffe didn't have air superiority, the RAF could have slaughtered a German invasion attempt. It would have been appalling, but it would have been done.
Like you, I question how serious Hitler was about invading Britain in 1940. He simply couldn't and he must have known that.
I agree.
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Historically it took until 1957 to develop missiles with the required range and payload - maybe war time need might might have got Germany there a bit quicker (along with their tech lead in the field), but I can't honestly see them being ready in time even if they had devoted everything to it. To make it worthwhile they would have needed a nuke warhead - somewhere else in the war economy is going to struggle if they devote so much to these very complex projects. Even small deviations in accuracy at these ranges mean you miss by miles so you need huge warheads - you could miss by enough that even nukes would do little harm.
I'm not convinced that Britain would have needed to surrender under assault from 1000's of V1/V2's - we suffered 1000's of bomb raids and kept going - The Germans didn't surrender under the enormous bomb raids they suffered either.
It is interesting to 'what if..' but would Germany have been better off concentrating on its proven technolagy rather than hoping for a wonder weapon to change everything.